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Background: This study tries to investigate how firms adjust their leverage policy
across the firm’s life cycle. For this purpose the study uses an extensive set of
data of 867 A listed Chinese non-financial firms over a nineteen years period
(1996-2014).
Methods: The study employs Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel data
model to estimate adjustment rate of leverage and its determinants in three
different life stages of Chinese firms. We find that adjustment rate of leverage
varies for different life stages.
Results: In accordance with trade off theory of capital structure this study reports a
low-high-low pattern of leverage across growth, maturity and decline stage of firms’ life
respectively. For total leverage, dynamic panel data reports highest adjustment rate for
growing firms, followed by mature firms and firms in declining stage of their life.
Conclusions: Both short term and long term leverage report similar pattern of
leverage’s adjustment rate across the three stages of life cycle. The study provides
useful insight in a unique market setting of Chinese financial markets.
Keywords: Firm life cycle, Leverage, Chinese firms, Dynamic adjustment, GMMBackground
This study investigates the dynamics of firm’s capital structure across firm’s life cycle.
The seminal theory of Modigliani and Miller 1958 about capital structure irrelevance
has created a ground for the development of a number of theories to explain the dy-
namics of capital structure which were followed by different empirical studies to prove
or deny these theories. However, there are many questions still unanswered regarding
variation in capital structure policies. One important consideration in this regard is
firm life cycle. The preference of financing alternatives and evolution of firm revolves
around its life cycle (Fluck 2000, Rocca et al. 2011). Life cycle affects firm’s numerous
characteristics. For example, Berger and Udell (1998) reported that life cycle affects the
demand for financial products in market. Drobetza and Wanzenried (2006) provided
evidence in dividend policy variations across firm’s life cycle, and more recently,
Connor and Byrne (2015) reported the influence of firm’s life cycle on corporateThe Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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gation under the changing life cycle of the firm so that policy makers are able to make
changes in leverage policies according to changing life cycle conditions. In the past
studies, researchers used univariate proxy for firm life cycle such as firm age or size to
study how capital structure respond to dynamics of its life cycle (Berger and Udell
1998). Moreover, there are studies that confirm that firm does follow a target capital
structure and firms adjust their leverage to an optimal level. Notable studies in this re-
gard include studies conducted by Ahsan et al. (2016a), Getzmann et al. (2014), Bradley
et al. (1984), and Bontempi and Golinelli (2001). Ahsan et al. (2016b) and Bontempi
and Golinelli (2001) used unit root testing to confirm that a percentage of firm follow a
target capital structure while Getzmann et al. (2014) used dynamic panel data model
(GMM) to find that firm adjust their capital structure and estimated an adjustment rate
for firms using generalized method of moment (GMM). More recently, Tian et al.
(2015) using a sample of public sector manufacturing Chinese firms and studied their
leverage adjustment across firm life cycle. This study differs from the study conducted
by Tian et al. (2015) in various aspects. First, this study uses firm age, sales growth, and
dividend payout ratio to measure firm life cycle while Tian et al. (2015) used cash flows
to measure life cycle of the firm. Further, we employ dynamic panel data model to esti-
mate adjustment rate of leverage while Tian et al. (2015) used fixed effect model. Our
study further differs in sample size and sample period Tian et al. (2015) reported a dif-
ferent adjustment rate for leverage across birth (68.52%) and decline (48.72%) stages of
firm’s life cycle. Our approach of multivariate firm life cycle measurement is in accord-
ance with Ahsan et al. (2016b). Ahsan et al. (2016b) found different adjustment rate for
growing, mature, and declining firms while analyzing a large data set of Pakistani non-
financial firms.
However the examination of leverage adjustment across firm life cycle lacks
extensive research. For this purpose, this study follows Anthony and Ramesh
(1992) and Ahsan et al. (2016b) and employ a multivariate approach in measure-
ment of firm life cycle to an unbalanced data of 15,005 firm level observations
(1996–2014) and categorize firms into three categories, i.e., growing firms, mature
firms, and declining firms. Further, the study uses dynamic panel data model to
estimate adjustment rate in these three life stages of firms and also examines vari-
ous multilevel determinants of leverage (firm-level, industry-level, and country-level
determinants).
The study contributes useful literature and insight on capital structure of an
emerging economy. Further, the findings are of great importance while considering
that prevalent financing alternatives in China are bank based loans and firms re-
port lower long-term leverage ratio. This low-high-low pattern of leverage ratio
across growth, maturity, and decline stage by Chinese firms indicates that leverage
policy is in accordance with trade-off theory. The study found that adjustment rate
for total leverage is 60-29-26% across growth, maturity, and decline stage. For
short-term leverage adjustment rate is 90-78-88% across growth, maturity, and
decline stages of firm life cycle. Long-term leverage reports an adjustment rate of
75-44-53% across growth, maturity, and decline stages. These findings suggest that
in growth stage, there are more investment opportunities, and thus, leverage is
vigorously altered by firms in growth stages.
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China as an emerging market and world’s second largest economy make it a potentially
distinctive setting to study the relationship between stock liquidity and capital struc-
ture. China is a unique setting to conduct such type of study. Due to its less sophisti-
cated capital markets, bank as the major financing alternative and high ownership
concentration make the relationship between life cycle and capital structure more cru-
cial from research point of view.
Moreover, before 2004, shares of state-owned and legal entities could be traded in
stock exchange. This situation is further complicated by the fact that control rights re-
main with Chinese government. Shares held by state-owned shareholders exceed other
shares held by other shareholders (individuals and NSOEs) in Chinese companies. Guo
et al. (2013) reported that by end of September 2006, largest shareholders who held
56% of shares were state shares controlled by Chinese government and other state asset
management companies.Capital markets and financing alternatives in China
The considerable economic restructuring and reform undergone by the Chinese econ-
omy over the last 30 years have led to a marked increase in the number of shareholding
companies. Chinese firms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and non-state-owned enter-
prises (NSOEs). SOEs and NSOEs differ in the nature of their ownership, agency rela-
tions, and bankruptcy risks.
The stock market in China has become an increasingly important part of China’s
economy since the partial privatization of SOEs and the establishment of the Shanghai
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in the early 1990s. The number of listed firms increased
from 50 in 1992 to 1378 in 2004, with the total market value of publicly traded shares
exceeding RMB (i.e., Renminbi, the Chinese currency) 3960 billion by the end of 2004.
There were 353 NSOEs listed on the exchanges at the end of 2004, approximately 25%
of the total number of listed firms. Although considerably smaller than SOEs, NSOEs
had a total market value of RMB 479 billion by the end of 2004 or 12.1% of the total
stock market value. Since 1979, China has launched a series of economic reforms to re-
orient its economy toward a market-based one. The most recent of these reforms is
corporatization of previously owned SOEs. Corporatization involves initial public offer-
ing of a minority portion of state shares to individual investors who can trade their
shares freely on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, while the majority own-
ership of these newly listed companies is still controlled by parent state enterprises.
The government still remains the majority shareholder and retains two key control
rights: the ultimate decision right concerning disposal of assets and mergers and acqui-
sitions and the appointment of chief executive officers (CEOs) (Qian 1996).
Capital markets in China are young and less sophisticated in China as compared to
other developed countries. Shanghai and Shenzan Stock exchanges were established in
1990, and it marks the beginning of securities market in China. China securities regula-
tory commission was introduced in 1992. Poncet et al. argue that capital market imper-
fections are prevalent in Chinese capital markets. Until 1998, the largest Chinese banks
(most of them were state owned) were advised not to give credit to Chinese private
companies. It was because of low political stature of these companies. Since 1998, these
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However, research evidence suggest that financing constraints for private Chinese com-
panies are still there due to social and political factors (Huang 2003). Numerous re-
search indicates that financial constraints are impediments to investment, growth, and
survival of the company (Stein 2003, Hubbard 1998). This implies that Chinese firms
(especially private firms) have fewer alternatives of debt financing.
The remainder of the study is arranged as follows. The “Background” section presents
a review of prior study and the theoretical framework. Data description and research
methodology constitute the “Methods” section. The “Results and discussion” section
provides detailed analysis and discussion of the findings. In the “Conclusions” section,
we provide a conclusion and some policy implications.Literature review and theoretical framework
Life cycle and target leverage
There exist numerous studies that confirm that firms passes through various life stages
starting from birth to a possible death. However, these studies vary as far as the number
of stages in life cycles is concerned. For example, Chandler (1962) and Anthony and
Ramesh (1992) suggest three life cycle stages of growth, maturity, and decline and
argue that firms strategic approach and alternatives greatly varies across these three life
cycles. Miller and Friesen (1980) suggested four life cycles, i.e., birth, growth maturity,
and revival. Dickinson (2011) identified birth, growth, maturity, decline, and revival as
five stages in life cycle of a firm. In the presence of all these differences, most of the
theories and studies about life cycle agreed upon growth, maturity, and decline as three
stages of firm life cycle. However, researches also have difference of opinion whether
firms follow target leverage across various firm’s life cycle stages. In light of this fact,
this study provides a detailed literature about theories that explains firm’s leverage ad-
justment and targeting across various stages of a firm’s life cycle.
According to pecking order theory, in the context of asymmetric information and
profitability, a firm would prefer internal financing, followed by less risky debt and
equity in the last resort (Myers 1984, Myers and Majluf 1984). Thus, on the basis of
pecking order theory of capital structure, a firm does not follow a target level of lever-
age and rather the firm follows a pattern in its leverage policy. Furthermore, a firm can
improve its informativeness and profits thus changing its financing mix accordingly.
During firm’s early stage, information asymmetry is higher and profitability is lower. As
time changes and growth approaches, information asymmetry is considerably reduced.
However, in growth stages, earnings are not retained or firms have no or less retained
earnings. In such times, firms tend to raise more debt as a source of financing its invest-
ment. As time of maturity approaches, firms tend to retain earnings and these are reasons
for debt financing decreases. Moreover, in maturity, firms have less investment needs and
thus firms may also raise equity in maturity stages because of less information asymmetry.
During decline phase profit decreases and also the retained earnings. This compels firms
to go again for debt financing. Thus Pecking Order Theory (POT) suggest that at growth
stage debt financing will be higher, at maturity it will be moderate and at decline stage it
will be higher again (see Table 1). On the basis of these arguments we formulate the
following hypothesis about firm leverage across three stages of firm life cycle.





Pecking order theory High Low High
Trade-off theory Low High Low
Agency cost theory Low High High
Diamond’s theory Low High High
Market timing theory ? ? ?
ur Rehman et al. China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:19 Page 5 of 22H1: The firm follows high-low-high pattern of leverage across three stages of firm life
cycle.
However, the competing trade-off capital theory (TOT) of capital structure postu-
lates that in a perfect environment, a firm makes a trade-off between the associ-
ated benefits and cost with financing alternatives. Thus, on the basis of this trade-
off analysis, a firm targets an optimal level of leverage. This is the static form of
trade-off theory. Moreover, capital structure is affected by a number of exogenous
and endogenous factors. These factors change over time especially across the stages
of a firm life cycle. As a result, the firm tries to adjust its capital structure accord-
ing to dynamic environment and this makes capital structure a dynamic decision
(Fischer et al. 1989). According to TOT irrespective of a firm life stage, a firm
should raise more debt to have a larger tax shield benefit; however, as debt in-
creases, the firm bankruptcy and financial distress risk also increases. Thus, a firm
always looks to achieve a breakeven point for its tax benefit and bankruptcy costs.
Bankruptcy chances are higher in growth and decline stage of a firm life cycle;
thus, during these stages a firm will avoid to raise more debt. Although more debt
will result in higher tax benefits, the firm will avoid raising more debt during
growth and decline stage. Thus, according to trade-off theory of capital structure,
firm leverage is expected to follow a low-high-low pattern across three stages of firm’s life
cycle (Modigliani and Miller 1958, Modigliani and Miller 1963), (see Table 1).
H2: The firm’s leverage follows a low-high-low pattern across three stages of firm’s
life cycle.
Another important theory is the agency cost theory. According to agency cost theory
(ACT), managers and shareholders are at conflict with respect to the use of free cash
flows and resources of the firms. These conflicts get more severe if there is a high
amount of free cash flows in an organization. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that
these conflicts can be solved through the use of optimal level of debt, since debt repay-
ment will eat up free cash flows and thus managers can be prevented from investing in
value decreasing projects. When a firm is growing, there are more investment oppor-
tunities and less free cash flows at growth stage compel firm to raise more debt. At ma-
turity stage, when investment opportunities shrink, the firm is expected to raise lesser
debt. While at decline stage, debt acts as a controlling mechanism when a firm is at the
helm of shrinking. Thus, according to ACT, firm leverage is expected to follow a high-
low-high pattern across the three stages of firm life cycle but still agency theory gives
no clear explanation of a targeted optimal capital structure (Jensen 1986).
H3: The firm follows a high-low-high pattern of leverage across the three stages of
firm’s life cycle.
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it can greatly explain firm’s financing preferences across different stages of firm’s
life cycle. Growing firms have less history or past record and have low reputa-
tion. They are characterized by less debt capacity, and thus, this information
asymmetry results in lower debt for firms in growing stages. At maturity and de-
cline, a firm has a track record and history. At these stages, there is lesser infor-
mation asymmetry and thus these firms have reputation. Based on these reasons,
firms at maturity and decline stage of their lives raise more debt. As a result,
Diamond suggests a low-high-high pattern of leverage across three life stages of
firm’s life cycle (see Table 1).
H4: The firm follows a low-high-high pattern of leverage across the three stages of
firm’s life cycle.
There is also a market timing theory of capital structure. The firms analyze market
condition and change their capital structure policy according to market conditions.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that capital structure can be explained through the
development of bond and stock market. So according to this theory, it is not possible
to predict a leverage pattern across firm’s life cycle.Variables’ description
Table 2 represents description of all the explanatory variables and their relationship
with leverage and leverage adjustment rate. For dependent variable of leverage, this
study uses financial leverage following the empirical studies of Delcoure (2007), Sheikh
and Qureshi (2014), Ahsan et al. (2016b), and Tian et al. (2015). The study uses three
proxies of leverage: short-term leverage (SL) which is the ratio of short-term loan to
total assets, long-term leverage (LT) is the ratio of long term loan to assets, and total
leverage (TL) is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.Methods
In order to investigate capital structure and explanatory variables, this study uses an ex-
tensive set of data. The study uses the data of 867 A-listed firms listed on Chinese
Stock exchanges. The data is annual and acquired from RESET Chinese database.
Industry-level data is calculated from firm-level data. All the macroeconomic level data
is collected from World Bank database. Data is collected over a period of 1996–2014.
Data is panel consisting of 15,005 observations. Data is unbalanced with respect to time
(year) and space (firms) dimensions.
We classify firms into three life stages, i.e., growing, mature, and declining firms. This
study follows a multivariate methodology to divide firms into three categories (Anthony
and Ramesh 1992). Univariate methodology is not used because it gives few measure-
ment errors and is not driven by firm size effects and risk preferences. Numerous stud-
ies can be found which employed the multivariate methodology to classify firms into
growth, mature, and decline categories (Teixeira and Santos 2006, Jenkins et al. 2004,
Ahsan et al. 2016b). This study uses dividend payout ratio, firm’s age, and firm’s annual
percentage change of sales for the classifications of firms into growing, mature, and de-
clining firms. We calculate the median values of annual change in sales and dividend
payout ratio for 5 years prior period. Then, we use the median values of sales, dividend
Table 2 Control variables, their proxies and proposed relationship with leverage











ZS Altman’s Z score +/− +
Business risk BR Annual change in net profit +/− +/−
Non-debt tax
shield
NDTS Ratio of depreciation to total
assets
− ?
Agency cost AGC Ratio of operating expense over
sales
+ ?
Growth GR Annual change in total assets +/− +
Current
profitability
CP Net profit scaled by total assets +/− +
Past
profitability
PP Retained earnings ratio +/− +
Liquidity LIQ Ratio of current assets to
current liabilities
+/− +





CV Ratio of gross fixed assets at
cost to total assets
+ ?







IL Mean of industry leverage + +
Industry
profitability
IP Mean of industry profit ? ?
Country
level










EG Annual per capita gdp rate +/− +
Capital
formation
CF Ratio of gross capital formation
to gdp
? ?
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based on three life cycle stages (Table 3).
This criterion is based on the fact that during growth stage, dividend payout ra-
tio is low, firms have lower sales, and firms are relatively young. As firm grows to-
ward maturity, dividend payout ratio increases so as the sales. At decline stage,
dividend payout ratio is the highest, sales growth is the lowest, and firms are of
old age. We assign a value of 1 to growing firms, 2 to mature firms, and 3 to de-
clining firms We sum up the median values of sales growth, median values of divi-
dend payout, and log values of age for each firm in a single year. The minimum
value of this summation is 3, and the maximum value is 9. Based on these thresh-
olds, we divide firms into three categories.
Growth firms: a firm having a composite yearly score of less than 4 is classified as a
firm in growth stage
Table 3 Criteria for life cycle distribution
Stage DP SG AGE
Growth Low High Young
Maturity Medium Medium Adult
Decline High Low Old
DP dividend payout ratio, SG sales growth, AGE natural log of firm’s age
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mature firm
Declining firms: firms having a composite yearly score of more than or equal to 8
As a calculation of median for sales growth and dividend payout ratio, we use
the prior 5-year data; as a result, our yearly firm level observations reduces to
10,274 from 15,005. Yearly firm level observations for growing firms are 1539, for
mature firms the observations are 7726, and for declining firms the number is
1009 firm year observations.
Table 4 reveals that dividend payout ratio is the lowest during growth stage
and then starts to increase as firm matures and then reaches to highest ratio in
the declining stage. Similarly, sales growth is highest for growing stage and then
become lower in maturity and lowest during the declining stage. Youngest firms
have lowest mean of age value, while firms in declining stage have the highest
mean for age.Statistical model and estimation strategy
According to Flannery and Rangan (2006), firms maintain a target leverage if there exist
no market friction. In this context, we develop the following static model for leverage
and explanatory variables.Table 4 Descriptive statistics of firms classification variables
Variables Observation Mean Standard deviation
Growth stage
Dividend payout ratio (median) 1539 0.058 0.094
Sales growth (median) 1539 0.300 0.159
Age 1539 2.670 0.199
Mature stage
Dividend payout ratio (median) 7726 0.202 0.244
Sales growth (median) 7726 0.138 0.191
Age 7726 2.873 0.201
Decline stage
Dividend payout ratio (median) 1009 0.456 0.202
Sales growth (median) 1009 0.057 0.093
Age 1009 3.020 0.105
Sales growth is the median of annual sales growth for prior 5 years. Dividend payout ratio is the median of dividend
payout ratio for prior 5 year. Age is the natural logarithm of firm’s age
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þβ7CPit þ β8PPit þ β9LIQit þ β10TANGit þ β11CVitβ12SIZEit
þβ13INDLEVjt þ β14INDPjt þ β15INFt þ β16ERt þ β17EGtβ18CFt þ eit
ð1Þ
In Eq. 1, LEVit is the firm i’s leverage at time t. TSit is the tax shield of firm i at time
t. ZSit is Altman’s Z score of firm i at time t. BRit represents business risk of a firm i at
time t. NDTSit is non-debt tax shield of a firm i at time t. AgCit represents agency costs
of a firm i at time t. GROWit is the annual growth rate of a firm i at time t. CPit repre-
sents current profit of a firm i at time t while PPit is past profits of a firm i at time t.
LIQit represents liquidity of a firm i at time t. TANGit represents the tangibility ratio of
a firm i at time t while CVit is collateral value of a firm i at time t. SIZEit is the firm i’s
size at time t. INDLEVjt represents the industry leverage of an industry j at time t.
INDPjt is the industry mean profit of an industry j at time t. INFt represents inflation
rate at time t. ERt is exchange rate at time t. EGt represents economic growth at time t.
CFt is gross capital formation.
However, firms inhabit a market that is under the effects of frictions; thus, due to
these market imperfections, it is difficult for a firm to immediately adjust to its target
capital. This phenomenon becomes more relevant if we consider the adjustment costs
associated with adjustment to a target leverage. Thus, another equation based on par-
tial adjustment of leverage emerges.
LEVit−LEVit−1 ¼ γ LEVit−LEVit−1ð Þ þ δit ð2Þ
LEVit is firm i’s leverage at time t and δit is the error term. By substituting Eq. 2 intoEq. 1, we get the following equation.
LEVit ¼ β0γ þ 1−γð ÞLEVt−1 þ γβ1TSit þ γβ2ZSit þ γβ3BRit þ γβ4NDTSit
þγβ5AgCit þ γβ6GROWit þ γβ7CPit þ γβ8PPit þ γβ9LIQit
þγβ10TANGit þ γβ11CVitγβ12SIZEit þ γβ13INDLEVjt þ γβ14INDPjtþγβ15INFt þ γβ16ERt þ γβ17EGtγβ18CFt þ ηi þ λt þ υit
ð3Þ
ηi in Eq. 3 corresponds to firm-specific effects while λt is the time-specific effects. Sim-
plifying Eq. 3, the following equation is obtained.
LEVit ¼ β0γ þ ρLEVt−1 þ δ1TSit þ δ2ZSit þ δ3BRit þ δ4NDTSit þ δ5AgCit
þδ6GROWit þ δ7CPit þ δ8PPit þ δ9LIQit þ δ10TANGit þ δ11CVit
þδ12SIZEit þ δ13INDLEVJ t þ δ14INDPjt þ δ15INFt þ δ16ERt þ δ17EGtþδ18CFt þ ηi þ λt þ υit
ð4Þ
In Eq. 4, α = γβ0; ρ = (1 − γ); δk = γβk; and λtνit = γeit
The study employs two-step generalized method of moments to estimate the dy-
namic Eq. 4 to address the issues of endogeneity. The study uses GMM’s method
of Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (2000) to estimate Eq. 4. We estimate
Eq. 4 across firm life cycle.
Table 5 Descriptive statistics
SL LL TL TS ZS BR NDTS AgC GROW CP PP LIQ TANG CV SIZE AGE INDSL INDLL INDTL INMP INF ER EG CF
Growth stage (no. of observations = 1539)
Mean 0.17 0.10 0.58 0.07 3.06 −0.06 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.52 1.34 0.26 0.53 22.05 2.67 0.17 0.10 0.59 0.05 2.83 7.07 9.93 45.00
Std. Dev. 0.15 0.11 0.26 3.51 20.25 28.64 0.02 0.07 0.47 0.16 2.82 1.32 0.19 0.21 1.33 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.96 2.04 0.77 1.97 2.91
Min 0.00 0.00 0.05 −134.83 −104 −177 0.00 0.00 −0.88 −2.98 −75.21 0.03 0.00 0.00 18.34 1.61 0.00 0.00 0.16 −0.92 −0.77 6.09 7.35 37.66
Max 2.50 0.80 5.42 15.79 551 1060 0.21 0.53 10.70 1.05 0.98 28.18 0.94 1.00 27.81 2.95 1.06 0.31 3.31 37.77 5.86 8.28 14.19 47.83
Maturity stage (no. of observations = 7226)
Mean 0.17 0.10 0.63 0.15 6.93 −0.40 0.03 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.47 1.39 0.24 0.55 21.89 2.87 0.17 0.10 0.60 0.04 2.68 7.17 9.90 44.65
Std. Dev. 0.22 0.11 1.04 1.46 140.73 27.26 0.02 0.07 44.09 0.81 5.79 2.76 0.19 0.22 1.34 0.20 0.06 0.06 0.31 0.61 1.96 0.83 1.92 3.10
Min 0.00 0.00 −0.19 −38.48 −515 −768 −0.03 0.00 −1.00 −20.6 −368.4 −5.13 0.00 0.00 14.08 1.61 0.00 0.00 0.16 −1.05 −0.7 6.09 7.35 37.66
Max 6.67 1.82 55.41 102 8070 1450 0.18 0.92 3850 44.22 0.99 205 0.92 1.00 28.04 3.22 0.75 0.49 6.07 37.77 5.86 8.28 14.19 47.83
Decline stage (no. of observations = 1009)
Mean 0.15 0.10 0.53 0.15 3.47 2.16 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.48 1.72 0.24 0.57 22.18 3.02 0.17 0.10 0.68 0.02 2.43 7.27 9.90 44.25
Std. Dev. 0.28 0.12 1.22 0.32 18.24 71.57 0.02 0.06 0.26 0.15 0.58 3.35 0.19 0.21 1.06 0.10 0.23 0.06 1.28 0.13 1.95 0.86 1.88 3.30
Min 0.00 0.00 0.01 −5.18 −14 −63.3 0.00 0.00 −0.77 −2.76 −10.94 0.06 0.00 0.02 17.58 2.80 0.02 0.00 0.25 −2.81 −0.7 6.09 7.35 37.66
Max 6.98 0.62 36.38 3.68 567 2250 0.14 0.44 2.46 0.90 0.97 89 0.86 0.98 25.26 3.22 6.98 0.31 36.38 1.23 5.86 8.28 14.19 47.83
SL is short-term leverage ratio between short-term loan and total assets. LL is long-term leverage ratio between long-term leverage and assets. TL represents total leverage which is a ratio of total liabilities and total as-
sets. TS represents tax shield calculated by dividing tax payments on net profit. ZS is Z score. BR is business risk measured through operating expense divided by total sales. NDTS is non-debt tax shield calculated
through the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Ag C represents agency costs. CP is current profit growth, calculated through annual growth rate of net profit. PP is retained earnings ratio as a proxy for past profit.
LIQ is firm liquidity measured through the ratio of current assets and current liabilities. TANG is tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. CV is collateral value, and it is the ratio of gross fixed
assets at cost to total book value of assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. AGE is natural log of firm’s age from the date of its listing. INDSL is industry short-term leverage measured from firm level
short term leverage. INDLL is industry long-term leverage measured from firm level long-term leverage ratio. INDTL is industry total leverage measured from firm level total leverage. INMP is industry annual mean profit
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Descriptive statistics
Table 5 represents the descriptive statistics. From mean values of short term (SL) and
long (LL) term leverage, it can be inferred that Chinese firms use more short term le-
verage than long term leverage. Mean value is highest for total leverage (TL). Table 5
shows as firms go toward maturity and decline stage its leverage increases except for
long term leverage (LL). Mean value for total leverage (TL) is 0.58 during growth, 0.63
during maturity, and 0.53 during decline stage. This low-high-low pattern of total lever-
age (TL) is in line with the trade-off theory of capital structure. For tax shield (TS), the
mean values increase from growth to maturity and remain the same for decline stage.
Mean for bankruptcy probability (Z score (ZS)) is the highest during growth stage
(6.93). Mean for agency costs (AgC = 0.06) is highest during growth stage so as the
mean of firm’s growth rate (GROW= 0.81). This is in line with agency theory. Agency
conflicts are higher during growth stage of a firm. Further, mean of current profit (CP
= 0.06) is highest during growth stage. It decreases as firm approaches decline stage
(0.05). Another interesting descriptive statistic is the mean of past profit (PP). Past
profits are measured through retained earnings. The mean of PP in growth stage is
0.52, 0.47 in mature stage, and 0.48 during decline stage. This shows that firm has high
retained earnings during growth stage, and at maturity and decline stage, firm do not
retained many earnings.Correlation matrix
Tables 6, 7, and 8 represent correlation matrices of short-term, long-term, and total le-
verage, respectively. VIF corresponding to each explanatory variable is given at the end
of each table. VIF is the variance inflation factor. VIF values are obtained after running
OLS regression for all three proxies of leverage. All the VIF values are less than 10. The
maximum values of VIF for short-term leverage correspond to capital formation (7.64);
for long-term leverage, capital formation (CF) again reports the highest VIF of 7.55.
For total leverage, exchange rate (ER) has the highest VIF value of 7.65. By looking at
the correlation values and VIF values in Tables 6, 7, and 8, it can be inferred that there
is no serious issue of multicolinearity.Adjustment rate of leverage
Tables 9, 10, and 11 show regression results for short-term, long-term, and total le-
verage, respectively. These results were obtained using dynamic panel data model.
Table 9 shows that for short-term leverage (SL), lagged short-term leverage (SL
(L1)) shows a positive and statistically significant coefficients (0.091, 0.220, 0.340)
for growth, maturity, and decline stage. This shows that Chinese forms follow a
target level of short term leverage across all the three life stages of a firm life
cycle. However, adjustment rate (1-coefficent) is highest for growing firms and low-
est for firms in the decline stage. This shows that during that stage, firms tend to
speedily adjust their leverage.
For long-term leverage (LL), Table 10 shows that coefficients for lagged leverage
(LLL1) are not only positive but also statistically significant. This shows that firms in
China follow a target level of long-term leverage. Adjustment rate (1-coefficient) is
Table 6 Correlation matrix (short-term leverage)
SL SL(L1) TS BR NDTS AgC GROW CP PP LIQ tang CV SIZE INDSL INMP INF ER EG CF VIF
SL 1 1.73
SL(L1) 0.68 1 1.24
TS 0.02 0.02 1 1
BR −0.01 0.01 0.00 1 1.01
NDTS 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 1 1.73
AgC −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.08 1 1.1
GROW −0.04 0.00 0.00 0.08 −0.10 −0.04 1 1.05
CP −0.25 −0.19 −0.02 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.08 1 1.2
PP 0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 1 1
LIQ −0.31 −0.25 −0.01 −0.02 −0.28 0.18 0.03 0.14 0.01 1 1.53
tang 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.60 −0.12 −0.05 −0.17 0.00 −0.33 1 1.93
CV −0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.45 −0.10 −0.05 0.11 −0.01 −0.43 0.46 1 1.62
SIZE −0.19 −0.20 −0.02 0.01 0.03 −0.21 0.10 0.04 0.00 −0.20 −0.04 0.05 1 1.38
INDSL 0.31 0.25 0.03 0.00 0.04 −0.02 0.00 −0.06 0.00 −0.07 0.11 −0.01 −0.23 1 1.29
INMP −0.02 −0.02 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.05 1 1
INF 0.03 −0.01 −0.02 0.02 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 −0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 1 1.45
ER 0.14 0.11 0.04 −0.02 0.13 −0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 −0.05 0.20 0.06 −0.34 0.40 −0.03 −0.09 1 7.51
EG 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.09 −0.05 0.08 0.08 0.02 −0.07 0.15 0.04 −0.22 0.32 −0.02 0.18 0.69 1 2.35
CF −0.14 −0.10 −0.04 0.02 −0.11 0.04 −0.04 −0.02 −0.01 0.05 −0.18 −0.05 0.32 −0.40 0.03 −0.15 −0.90 −0.74 1 7.64
SL is short-term leverage ratio between short-term loan and total assets. LL is long-term leverage ratio between long-term leverage and assets. TL represents total leverage which is a ratio of total liabilities and total as-
sets. TS represents tax shield calculated by dividing tax payments on net profit. ZS is Z score. BR is business risk measured through operating expense divided by total sales. NDTS is non-debt tax shield calculated
through the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Ag C represents agency costs. CP is current profit growth, calculated through annual growth rate of net profit. PP is retained earnings ratio as a proxy for past profit.
LIQ is firm liquidity measured through the ratio of current assets and current liabilities. TANG is tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. CV is collateral value, and it is the ratio of gross fixed
assets at cost to total book value of assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. AGE is natural log of firm’s age from the date of its listing. INDSL is industry short term leverage measured from firm level
short-term leverage. INDLL is industry long term leverage measured from firm level long-term leverage ratio. INDTL is industry total leverage measured from firm level total leverage. INMP is industry annual mean profit

















Table 7 Correlation matrix (long-term leverage)
LL LL(L1) TS BR NDTS AgC GROW CP PP LIQ TANG CV SIZE INDLL INMP INF ER EG CF VIF
LL 1 1.64
LL(L1) 0.84 1 1.24
TS −0.01 −0.01 1 1
BR 0.00 0.01 0.00 1 1.01
NDTS 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 1 1.76
AgC −0.25 −0.24 0.04 −0.01 −0.08 1 1.12
GROW 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.07 −0.03 1 1.04
CP −0.12 −0.09 −0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.13 1 1.2
PP −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 1 1
LIQ −0.13 −0.17 −0.01 −0.02 −0.26 0.13 −0.02 0.13 0.01 1 1.26
TANG 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.59 −0.14 −0.04 −0.17 0.00 −0.29 1 1.93
CV 0.31 0.30 0.01 0.02 0.46 −0.14 −0.02 0.10 −0.01 −0.35 0.46 1 1.62
SIZE 0.20 0.21 −0.01 −0.01 0.04 −0.19 0.07 0.07 −0.01 −0.15 −0.06 0.04 1 1.32
INDLL −0.07 −0.06 0.00 0.01 0.05 −0.01 0.02 −0.05 0.00 −0.07 0.10 −0.02 −0.24 1 1.24
INMP −0.02 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.06 1 1
INF −0.03 0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 1 1.43
ER −0.01 −0.04 0.03 0.01 0.17 −0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 −0.04 0.23 0.07 −0.35 0.40 −0.03 −0.08 1 7.5
EG 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.12 −0.05 0.06 0.08 0.02 −0.06 0.18 0.04 −0.23 0.33 −0.02 0.18 0.70 1 2.39
















Table 8 Correlation matrix total leverage
TL TL(L1) TS BR NDTS AgC GROW CP PP LIQ TANG CV SIZE INDTL INMP INF ER EG CF VIF
TL 1 1.57
TL(L1) 0.90 1 1.4
TS 0.01 0.00 1 1
BR 0.02 0.03 0.00 1 1
NDTS −0.13 −0.10 0.01 0.00 1 1.7
AgC −0.22 −0.22 0.02 −0.01 −0.10 1 1.12
GROW 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.03 −0.02 −0.03 1 1.02
CP −0.25 −0.18 −0.01 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.09 1 1.16
PP −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 1 1
LIQ −0.25 −0.22 −0.01 −0.01 −0.04 0.03 −0.01 0.04 0.00 1 1.08
TANG −0.05 −0.05 0.01 0.00 0.60 −0.14 −0.01 −0.17 0.00 −0.08 1 1.87
CV −0.11 −0.12 0.01 0.01 0.43 −0.12 −0.01 0.09 −0.01 −0.11 0.45 1 1.4
SIZW 0.42 0.40 0.00 0.01 0.05 −0.18 0.05 0.05 −0.01 −0.11 −0.03 0.06 1 1.39
INDTL 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 −0.02 −0.02 −0.06 0.00 −0.03 0.10 −0.01 −0.21 1 1.24
INMP −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.01 −0.05 1 1
INF 0.01 0.02 −0.02 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.02 −0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 1 1.46
ER −0.09 −0.14 0.03 −0.01 0.15 −0.07 0.00 −0.02 0.00 −0.02 0.23 0.06 −0.30 0.40 −0.03 −0.08 1 7.65
EG −0.04 −0.06 0.03 0.00 0.11 −0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 −0.02 0.17 0.04 −0.19 0.33 −0.02 0.18 0.70 1 2.37
















Table 9 GMM estimation results for short-term leverage
Growth Maturity Decline
Coef. z P > z Coef. z P > z Coef. z P > z
Adjustment rate 0.905 0.780 0.64
SL(L1) 0.095 3.83 0.0000 0.220 6.88 0.000 0.340 4.24 0.000
TS −0.004 −0.49 0.6210 −0.004 −1.12 0.262 0.018 1.95 0.052
BR 0.000 0.06 0.9550 0.000 2.66 0.008 0.000 −15 0.000
ZS 0.001 0.91 0.3610 0.000 −12.32 0.000 0.000 −0.37 0.714
NDTS −0.763 −1.56 0.1180 −0.038 −0.17 0.867 −0.490 −2.76 0.006
AgC −0.092 −0.6 0.5490 0.044 0.61 0.544 −0.577 −4.8 0.000
GROW −0.031 −3.84 0.0000 −0.003 −0.65 0.515 −0.009 −1.84 0.066
CP −0.187 −4.5 0.0000 −0.109 −4.11 0.000 −0.074 −2.29 0.022
PP −0.011 −2.94 0.0030 −0.009 −2.18 0.029 −0.013 −4.49 0.000
LIQ −0.083 −10.56 0.0000 −0.046 −8.98 0.000 −0.051 −7.47 0.000
TANG −0.006 −0.34 0.7330 −0.025 −1.7 0.089 0.024 1.98 0.047
CV −0.051 −2.63 0.0090 −0.034 −3.04 0.002 −0.018 −1.27 0.205
SIZE 0.003 0.31 0.7590 0.016 2.15 0.031 −0.005 −0.61 0.540
INDSL 0.506 5.77 0.0000 0.281 5.21 0.000 0.344 7.9 0.000
INMP 0.003 5.58 0.0000 0.002 4.36 0.000 0.113 7.01 0.000
INF 0.001 0.69 0.4880 0.002 2.92 0.004 0.000 0.57 0.569
ER −0.019 −1.52 0.1280 0.010 1.5 0.134 −0.022 −3.25 0.001
EG 0.006 3.57 0.0000 −0.001 −0.94 0.345 −0.005 −4.43 0.000
CF 0.001 0.48 0.6280 −0.001 −0.87 0.385 −0.008 −6.46 0.000
_cons 0.199 0.68 0.4950 −0.231 −1.15 0.252 0.834 4.03 0.000
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(LL) unlike short term leverage (SL) reposts lowest adjustment rate for firms in matur-
ity stage. This shows that firms adjust their long-term leverage more speedily during
growth and decline stage.
For total leverage, Table 11 reports that all the three lagged leverage (TL L1) are
positive as well as strongly significant. This shows that Chinese firms follow a tar-
get level of all three proxies of leverage (short term leverage, long term leverage,
and total leverage). Total leverage (TL) reports the highest adjustment rate for
growing firms (0.596) and lowest for firms in declining stage (0.26). This again
confirms that firms in their growing stage tend to speedily adjust to their target
level of leverage.
Thus, all three proxies of leverage regression results showed that firms in growing
phase speedily fill the gap between actual and target leverage. The reason is that during
growing stage, firms have highest investment opportunities and in order to avail these
opportunities, there are vigorous adjustment of leverage. For declining stage, adjust-
ment speeds are lowest because during this stage investment opportunities are less and
firms do not need to quickly adjust their leverage positions. These adjustment speeds
are in line with studies conducted by Getzmann et al. (2014), and Ahsan et al. (2016b).
These studies found adjustment speed between 20 and 60% for Asian countries.
Table 10 GMM estimation results for long term leverage
Growth Maturity Decline
Coef. z P > z Coef. z P > z Coef. z P > z
Adjustment rate 0.750 0.435 0.541
LL(L1) 0.250 13.2 0.000 0.565 18.35 0.000 0.459 34.73 0.000
TS −0.054 −9.4 0.000 0.000 −0.08 0.938 −0.008 −1.61 0.106
BR −0.001 −1.57 0.117 0.000 −1.59 0.112 −0.001 −0.9 0.368
ZS 0.001 3.37 0.001 0.000 −0.27 0.789 −0.001 −4.72 0.000
NDTS 0.664 2.84 0.005 −1.103 −4.5 0.000 −0.845 −5.49 0.000
AgC −0.037 −0.77 0.440 −0.020 −0.24 0.810 −0.043 −0.59 0.552
GROW −0.007 −1.67 0.095 0.020 3.99 0.000 0.045 8.95 0.000
CP −0.025 −1.2 0.231 −0.094 −4.97 0.000 −0.089 −4.37 0.000
PP −0.003 −1.12 0.265 0.000 −3.92 0.000 −0.001 −0.31 0.755
LIQ 0.014 2.44 0.015 0.029 4.63 0.000 0.018 8.52 0.000
TANG −0.023 −2.25 0.024 0.013 1.21 0.225 −0.018 −2.67 0.008
CV 0.049 3.67 0.000 0.055 5.79 0.000 0.046 6.23 0.000
SIZE 0.028 5.46 0.000 −0.012 −1.61 0.107 0.012 2.42 0.016
INDLL 0.353 5.19 0.000 0.478 6.77 0.000 0.467 16.03 0.000
INMP −0.001 −1.96 0.050 0.000 1.23 0.217 0.009 0.7 0.482
INF −0.001 −0.75 0.456 −0.001 −1.25 0.210 −0.001 −3.04 0.002
ER 0.042 5.02 0.000 −0.002 −0.32 0.751 0.015 3.43 0.001
EG 0.004 2.75 0.006 −0.002 −1.91 0.057 −0.003 −5.6 0.000
CF 0.006 3.8 0.000 −0.001 −0.68 0.497 −0.004 −4.06 0.000
_cons −1.254 −7.27 0.000 0.290 1.39 0.164 −0.166 −1.24 0.215
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This section provides explanation for relationship between leverage and explanatory
variables and adjustment of leverage due to these relationships. Table 9 reports a posi-
tive and statistically significant coefficient for tax shield (TS) during mature stage. This
shows that during decline stages, non-financial firms in China increase short-term debt
to gain more tax advantage during mature stage. However, Table 10 shows that tax
shield shows a negative relationship with long-term leverage (LL) during decline stage.
This might be due to the reason that short-term and long-term debt are negatively cor-
related (refer to correlation matrices), and thus, it can be inferred that during decline
stages firms in China tends to raise less long-term leverage due to tax benefits they get
from short term leverage. Table 9 shows that for higher earnings, volatility or business
risk shows no association with short term leverage. However, Table 10 for long-term le-
verage (LL) shows that during growth and maturity, the relationship between business
risk (BR) and long-term leverage is negative, and even at maturity stage, it has a nega-
tive significant relationship. This shows that as firms enter into maturity, firms realize
its long-term profitability and this slows down adjustment in leverage. In decline stage,
this relationship for long term leverage (LL Table 10) is positive and thus firm again try
to speedily adjust their leverage. For bankruptcy risk (ZS), short-term leverage (SL;
Table 9) shows a positive and significant coefficient explaining the disciplinary role of
bankruptcy risk in short-term leverage adjustment for growth stage. Table 10 shows
that for long-term leverage (LL; Table 10), bankruptcy risk (ZS) shows a positive and
Table 11 GMM estimation results for total leverage
Growth Maturity Decline
Coef. z P > z Coef. z P > z Coef. Z P > z
Adjustment rate 0.594 0.286 0.268
TL(L1) 0.406 8.99 0.000 0.714 19.08 0.000 0.732 22.95 0.000
TS −0.032 −4.18 0.000 0.001 5.03 0.000 −0.002 −0.45 0.651
BS −0.001 −0.59 0.555 0.000 −1.89 0.059 0.000 −9.27 0.000
ZS 0.000 1.34 0.180 0.000 −0.4 0.692 0.001 6.32 0.000
NDTS −1.157 −3.71 0.000 −2.074 −7.17 0.000 −0.160 −0.53 0.598
AgC −0.125 −1.49 0.135 0.104 1.08 0.278 −0.315 −3.62 0.000
GROW 0.005 3 0.003 0.004 1.34 0.182 0.088 7.25 0.000
CP −0.145 −6.53 0.000 −0.183 −7.9 0.000 −0.247 −7.68 0.000
PP −0.007 −1.51 0.132 −0.001 −5.19 0.000 −0.002 −0.51 0.607
LIQ −0.102 −18.19 0.000 −0.002 −3 0.003 −0.007 −12.49 0.000
TANG −0.003 −0.2 0.838 −0.016 −1.19 0.233 −0.046 −3.5 0.000
CV −0.033 −2.71 0.007 0.022 1.94 0.052 0.032 3.12 0.002
SIZE 0.031 4.01 0.000 0.062 7.6 0.000 0.028 3.57 0.000
INDLL 0.062 6.99 0.000 0.018 2.01 0.044 0.000 0.05 0.959
INMP 0.001 1.4 0.160 0.002 7.56 0.000 −0.010 −0.56 0.578
INF 0.001 1.83 0.068 0.002 3.68 0.000 0.002 2.28 0.023
ER 0.036 3.75 0.000 0.054 8.57 0.000 0.024 3.22 0.001
EG −0.001 −0.78 0.436 −0.002 −2.18 0.030 0.000 0.1 0.919
CF 0.003 1.77 0.078 0.004 3.73 0.000 0.002 1.58 0.115
_cons −0.577 −2.42 0.016 −1.750 −8.61 0.000 −0.737 −3.41 0.001
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cline stage. This shows that during growth, firms speedily adjust their adjustment rate
due to bankruptcy risk in an uncertain environment and this adjustment decreases dur-
ing decline stage.
For total leverage (TL; Table 11), the bankruptcy (ZS) relationship lacks statistical sig-
nificance; however, during decline stage, it reports a positive and significant relationship
which confirms that leverage is speedily adjusted, and as total leverage include greater
proportion of short term leverage, thus, it can be inferred that adjustment involves
mainly the short term leverage adjustment during the decline stage for total leverage.
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) shows strong negative relationship with all three proxies
of leverage (SL, LL, TL) during maturity and decline stages. This shows that firms in
China have greater NDTS advantage as compared to tax shield during maturity and de-
cline. This greater NDTS advantage coupled with less investment opportunities compel
firms to raise more debts and thus report a lower adjustment rate during mature and
decline stages. Agency costs (AgC) lack statistical significance for all three stages. How-
ever, for short-term and total leverage (SL-TL), this relationship is negative and signifi-
cant in decline stage. This shows that during decline stage, there are not much
investment opportunities that can create agency conflicts and firms do not raise more
debt to increase its disciplinary role during decline stage. Negative association of
growth opportunities (GROW) with short-term leverage (SL; Table 9) indicates that
firms do not use short-term loan to finance their long-term investment opportunities,
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verage. On the other hand, growth opportunities (GROW) show positive and significant
relationship with both short-term and total leverage (Tables 10 and 11) in almost all
three stages of firm’s life cycle. This indicates that to finance long-term investment op-
portunities, firms tend to raise long-term leverage and this increases adjustment rate
for leverage especially during maturity stage.
Tables 9, 10, and 11 show that both current profit (CP) and past profit (PP) show
negative and statistically significant association with short-term (SL), long-term (LL),
and total leverage (TL) across all three life cycle stages. This is in line with pecking
order theory (POT) that firms first uses internal funds to finance investment projects
and then they opt for external financing. This negative relationship slows adjustment of
leverage across all three stages of a firm’s life cycle. We find mixed relationship for tan-
gibility (TANG) and collateral value (CV).
However, during decline stage, collateral value shows a positive and significant rela-
tionship for long-term (LL) and total leverage (TL). This shows that high collateral
value during decline stage gives firm better credit rating for bank financing and thus it
speeds up leverage adjustment.
Firm’s size (SIZE) shows a significant and positive association with leverage during all
stages. This indicates bigger firms enjoy reputation and have better credit rating in line
with trade-off theory. Thus, firm’s size speeds up leverage adjustment across all three
stages of firm’s life cycle.
Industry leverage (INDSL, INDLL, and INDTL) shows positive and signifi-
cant relationship with firm’s leverage indicating that firm follows industry in
its leverage decisions across all three stages of a firm’s life cycle. However, in-
dustry profitability (INMP) shows both positive and negative relationship. For
long-term leverage (Ll), industry profitability shows a negative relationship
during growing stage, which is in line with pecking order theory (POT). This
shows that as industry becomes more profitable so as the firm, firms tend to
use internal funds to finance their investment opportunities and do not raise
external funds.Table 12 Sargan and Abond test results
Number of groups No. of instruments Sargan Test Abond Test
Short-term leverage
Growth 218 95 0.163 0.3685
Maturity 651 95 0.2321 0.2784
Decline 168 95 0.4733 0.7261
Long-term leverage
Growth 204 95 0.3057
Maturity 600 95 0.033 0.095
Decline 150 95 0.3328 0.4291
Total leverage
Growth 252 95 0.1517 0.1027
Maturity 699 95 0.3105 0.8352
Decline 190 95 0.4264 0.231
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and total leverage (TL) across all three stages of life cycle. This shows that due to
the effects of inflation, firms speedily adjust their book leverages and thus inflation
speeds up adjustment rate across all three stages. Exchange rate (ER) shows posi-
tive and significant coefficients for long-term (LL) and total leverage (TL). This re-
lationship holds for all three stages of life cycle. This shows firms value exchange
rate in their leverage adjustment decisions. As most of Chinese firms are export
oriented, thus exchange rate has a role in high adjustment rate of Chinese firms.
Both economic growth (EG) and capital formation (CF) show mixed results. In
growth stage, they report negative while in maturity stage they show positive coef-
ficients. Thus, during mature stages, firms are able to reap the benefits of eco-
nomic growth and speedily adjust their leverage (Ahsan et al. 2016b).
In the end, Table 12 provides results of post estimation tests for GMM estimation. In
all cases, the number of groups are higher than the number of instruments. The p
values for both Sragan and Arelleano Bond test are insignificant which confirms the es-
timation through generalized method of moments.Table 13 ANOVA
Variable Stages F Statistics
Growth Maturity Decline F value Prob > F
SL 0.17 0.17 0.15 35.23 0.000
LL 0.1 0.1 0.1 43.12 0.000
TL 0.58 0.63 0.53 65.34 0.000
TS 0.07 0.15 0.15 27.21 0.000
ZS 3.06 6.93 3.47 26.13 0.000
BR -0.06 -0.4 2.16 27.12 0.000
NDTS 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.87 0.429
AgC 0.05 0.06 0.05 23.15 0.000
GROW 0.18 0.81 0.13 29.36 0.000
CP 0.04 0.06 0.05 21.47 0.000
PP 0.52 0.47 0.48 22 0.000
LIQ 1.34 1.39 1.72 33.19 0.000
TANG 0.26 0.24 0.24 27.15 0.000
CV 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.17 0.368
SIZE 22.05 21.89 22.18 24.12 0.000
AGE 2.67 2.87 3.02 13.14 0.000
INDSL 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.247
INDLL 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.14 0.637
INDTL 0.59 0.6 0.68 12.14 0.000
INMP 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.28 0.234
INF 2.83 2.68 2.43 19.58 0.000
ER 7.07 7.17 7.27 11.12 0.000
EG 9.93 9.9 9.9 0.53 0.186
CF 45 44.65 44.25 24.15 0.000
Table 14 Blundell and Bond GMM estimation for long-term leverage
Growth Maturity Decline
Coef. Z P > z Coef. z P > z Coef. z P > z
Adjustment rate 0.735 0.420 0.536
LL(L1) 0.265 5.31 0.000 0.580 12.560 0.000 0.464 6.33 0.000
TS −0.062 −8.09 0.000 0.000 −0.630 0.527 −0.022 −5.26 0.000
BR 0.005 4.44 0.000 0.000 −0.310 0.753 −0.001 −2.16 0.031
ZS −0.002 −3.49 0.000 0.000 −0.860 0.389 −0.001 −8.3 0.000
NDTS 0.522 3.04 0.002 −0.753 −2.830 0.005 −0.679 −4.18 0.000
AgC 0.016 0.18 0.860 0.026 0.320 0.750 −0.099 −1.32 0.187
GROW −0.007 −2.21 0.027 0.027 4.300 0.000 0.010 2.29 0.022
CP −0.066 −5.42 0.000 −0.103 −4.630 0.000 −0.102 −6.05 0.000
PP 0.000 −6.79 0.000 0.000 0.740 0.459 0.000 1.95 0.051
LIQ 0.020 6.67 0.000 0.027 4.310 0.000 0.014 8.83 0.000
TANG −0.012 −3.72 0.000 0.003 0.230 0.817 −0.016 −2.66 0.008
CV 0.016 1.53 0.126 0.056 6.270 0.000 0.047 10.65 0.000
SIZE 0.024 5.36 0.000 −0.010 −1.400 0.161 0.042 8.44 0.000
INDLL 0.338 4.12 0.000 0.431 5.270 0.000 0.419 11.42 0.000
INMP −0.004 1.96 0.043 0.000 1.140 0.270 −0.006 0.34 0.148
INF −0.001 0.28 0.486 −0.002 0.240 0.586 0.000 0.48 0.476
ER 0.041 13 0.000 −0.005 −0.810 0.420 0.023 5.97 0.000
EG 0.003 3.83 0.000 0.001 0.990 0.324 0.000 −0.57 0.571
CF 0.001 3.22 0.001 −0.001 −0.820 0.413 −0.001 −1.69 0.091
_cons −0.898 −6.75 0.000 0.214 0.970 0.332 −0.999 −6.84 0.000
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In order to add robustness to our findings, we conducted ANOVA analysis and esti-
mated our equation with a more novel method of dynamic estimation (Blundell and
Bond system estimation). Table 13 corresponds to robustness analysis.
Analysis of variance suggests that null hypothesis for most of the variables is rejected
which suggest that means of different groups (across life cycle) are not equal. For one
firm-specific variable non-debt tax shield (NDTS), the null hypothesis of difference of
means cannot be rejected. For industry level for short-term and long-term leverage,
there exists no significance difference of means.
Further, the Blundell and Bond GMM estimation is in conformance with our previ-
ous estimation of dynamic adjustment speed except for the short-term leverage. Both
long-term and total leverage (Tables 14 and 15) reports results in consistency with our
previous estimation.
For long-term leverage, Table 14 reports adjustment rates of 0.73, 0.42, and 0.53 for
growth, maturity, and decline stages, respectively. The trend in dynamic adjustment
rate for long-term leverage according to the system estimation (Blundell and Bond) is
in accordance with our argument that adjustment of financial leverage is higher during
the growth stage; it reduces toward maturity and then increases during the decline
stage.
Similarly, Blundell and Bond estimation for total leverage (Table 15) shows that fi-
nancial leverage in Chinese firms follows a high-low-high pattern across the three
Table 15 Blundell and Bond GMM estimation for total leverage
Growth Maturity Decline
Coef. z P > z Coef. z P > z Coef. z P > z
Adjustment rate 0.604 0.287 0.278
TL(L1) 0.397 6.730 0.000 0.713 10.870 0.000 0.722 7.630 0.000
TS −0.687 −0.890 0.372 −0.060 4.870 0.000 −0.490 −2.520 0.012
BR −0.218 −1.300 0.194 0.026 0.900 0.368 −0.160 −1.850 0.064
ZS −0.195 −1.850 0.064 −0.001 −1.130 0.258 0.066 4.660 0.000
NDTS 1.250 −4.590 0.000 0.730 −5.080 0.000 1.120 −1.820 0.069
AgC 0.128 1.920 0.055 0.005 0.060 0.949 0.007 −1.820 0.069
GROW 0.005 2.750 0.006 0.007 5.010 0.000 0.003 3.820 0.000
CP −0.173 −1.530 0.125 −0.147 −7.730 0.000 −0.213 −4.220 0.000
PP −0.014 −2.460 0.014 −0.008 −3.190 0.001 −0.005 −2.100 0.035
LIQ −0.102 −23.920 0.000 −0.101 −2.080 0.037 −0.716 −6.190 0.000
TANG 0.233 0.180 0.857 −3.449 −2.260 0.024 −2.999 −2.580 0.010
CV −0.433 −6.340 0.000 −0.510 2.090 0.036 −0.689 2.780 0.005
SIZE 0.023 5.500 0.000 0.031 3.670 0.000 0.036 6.880 0.000
INDLL 0.062 3.250 0.000 0.058 4.210 0.000 0.038 3.140 0.000
INMP 0.004 1.370 0.287 0.002 0.376 0.145 0.002 0.852 0.129
INF 0.020 2.140 0.000 0.031 3.540 0.000 0.050 4.120 0.000
ER 0.038 3.870 0.000 0.039 4.780 0.000 0.035 3.160 0.002
EG 0.311 2.270 0.023 0.417 3.340 0.001 −0.039 −0.300 0.767
CF 0.147 1.910 0.056 0.222 3.600 0.000 0.071 1.070 0.284
_cons −0.663 −3.100 0.002 −1.340 −4.040 0.000 −0.830 −5.880 0.000
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ness to our results.
Conclusions
This study tries to investigate how firms adjust their leverage policy across the firm’s
life cycle. For this purpose, the study uses an extensive set of data of 860 A-listed Chin-
ese non-financial firms over a 19-year period (1996–2014). The study uses Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel data model to estimate adjustment rate of le-
verage and its determinants in three different life stages of Chinese firms. We
find that adjustment rate of leverage varies for different life stages. In accordance
with the trade-off theory of capital structure, this study reports a low-high-low
pattern of leverage across growth, maturity, and decline stage of firms’ life, re-
spectively. For total leverage, dynamic panel data reports highest adjustment rate
for growing firm, followed by mature firms, and then firms in declining stage of
their life. Both short-term and long-term leverage report similar pattern of lever-
age’s adjustment rate across the three life cycles. The firm life cycle measure in
this study is based on a multivariate technique using firm’s age, sales growth, and
dividend payout ratio.
The study finds that profitability is one of the integral determinants of leverage ad-
justment in China in line with pecking order theory. All determinants had implications
for long-term and total leverage.
ur Rehman et al. China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:19 Page 22 of 22The study provides useful insight in young and unique market setting of Chinese finan-
cial markets and prevalent of bank loans in Chinese market. The study will help policy
makers to increase financing options in debt abundant financial markets like China.
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